Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

4-29-2009

Unmarried Couples and the Mortgage Interest
Deduction
Patricia A. Cain
Santa Clara University School of Law, pcain@scu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Automated Citation
Patricia A. Cain, Unmarried Couples and the Mortgage Interest Deduction (2009),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/631

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

®

tax notes
Unmarried Couples and the
Mortgage Interest Deduction
By Patricia A. Cain
Patricia A. Cain is the Inez Mabie Distinguished
Professor of Law at Santa Clara University. The author
is in a long-term committed relationship that is not
recognized as a marriage under federal tax law. She
and her partner/spouse recently moved from Iowa to
Northern California, where the housing prices are
considerably higher than in the rest of the country. See
note 8, infra.
In 2006, I complained in Tax Notes about the issuance
of chief counsel advice (ILM 200608038 (Feb. 24, 2006),
Doc 2006-3875, 2006 TNT 39-13) that concluded Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), did not apply to the community earnings of California registered domestic partners (RDPs).1 Because the state law that causes Poe v.
Seaborn to apply to California2 spouses is exactly the
same state law that applies to RDPs, it is difficult to
understand why spouses reporting separately at the
federal level must split their community earnings and
RDPs cannot. As I argued in that article, Poe v. Seaborn is
a case about state property rights, not marriage. Further,
if Seaborn is to be reversed or not applied to RDPs, it is up
to Congress and not the IRS to make that determination.
Tax practitioners and return preparers in California
have managed to muddle through the community property tax problems of their RDP clients for more than three
years. No one is clear about which community property
rules the IRS is likely to apply to California RDPs — apart
from the narrow rule in the chief counsel advice requiring each partner to report his own personal service
earnings. Even those who feel bound to follow the chief
counsel advice wonder aloud how it came to be that the
only published rule on taxation of RDPs is contained in a
written determination that, by law, cannot be used or
cited as precedent.3
It now appears that the IRS has decided to create
another ‘‘nonprecedent’’ rule for many same-sex, as well
as unmarried opposite-sex, couples in California. An

1
See Patricia A Cain, ‘‘Relitigating Seaborn: Taxing the Community Income of California Registered Domestic Partners,’’ Tax
Notes, May 1, 2006, p. 561, Doc 2006-7375, or 2006 TNT 84-33.
2
The rule announced in Poe v. Seaborn was extended to
California spouses on the basis of the California community
property system in United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931).
3
See section 6110(j)(3).

internal legal memorandum issued to an IRS attorney in
San Francisco last November (ILM 200911007 (Nov. 24,
2008), Doc 2009-5566, 2009 TNT 48-15), but not released
until March 2009, deals with the question of how to
compute the limitation on mortgage interest deductions
for unmarried couples.
Section 163(h)(3) authorizes a deduction for any mortgage interest paid on acquisition indebtedness incurred
to purchase or improve a principal residence or a secondary residence. The provision was enacted in 1986 and
revised in 1987. In the 1987 revision, Congress limited the
amount of acquisition indebtedness interest that a taxpayer could claim. It did so by capping the amount of
debt that could be treated as acquisition debt. The code
provides that the ‘‘aggregate amount treated as acquisition indebtedness for any period shall not exceed
$1,000,000 ($500,000 in the case of a married individual
filing a separate return).’’4
In 1987 the median price of a home at the national
level, as reported by the National Association of
Realtors, was $86,000.5 By 2008 that number had more
than doubled to $197,000.6 So even now, most homeowners in the United States are not affected by the $1 million
cap set by Congress. But those metropolitan area reports
do not tell the whole story. In several towns and cities,
especially in California, the median price of a singlefamily home is well above $1 million. This is especially
true in Silicon Valley. Even though real estate prices are
declining, the median price for a home in Palo Alto is
$1.7 million.7 Prices are similar in surrounding communities.8 Comparable homes in other states sell at much
lower prices.9
As a result of escalating home prices in California,
there are many home buyers who do incur more than $1

4

Section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
See
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/18/realestate/
data-update-october-18-1987.html.
6
National Association of Realtors, ‘‘Median Sales Price of
Existing Single-Family Homes for Metropolitan Areas,’’ available
at http://www.realtor.org/research/research/metroprice.
7
See http://www.altosresearch.com/research/CA/PALO+
ALTO. And that figure is down from above $2 million in May
2008.
8
In neighboring Menlo Park, the median price is $1.3 million,
also down from 2008. Most of the cities neighboring Palo Alto
are well above $1 million in median home prices (for example,
Atherton, $4.2 million; Woodside, $2.15 million; Los Altos and
Portola Valley, $1.8 million; Burlingame, $1.4 million; Los Gatos,
$1.28 million; and Cupertino, $1.2 million). Id.
9
See, e.g., William J. Turnier and Grayson M.P. McCouch,
Family Wealth Management at p. 342 (2005) (comparing 2005
median home prices between Cedar Rapids, Iowa, $150,000;
Seattle, $281,000; San Francisco, $832,000; and Palo Alto, Calif.,
$1,009,000).
5
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The only rationale offered in the chief counsel advice
is that section 163(h)(3) defines acquisition indebtedness
as indebtedness that is incurred in acquiring a ‘‘qualified
residence’’11 and not a ‘‘portion of a qualified residence.’’
(Emphasis in the original.) Qualified residence is not
separately defined in section 163(h)(3). Instead, the definition is incorporated from section 121, the provision that
excludes from taxation a portion of the gain from the sale
of a principal residence. Under section 121, if there are
two or more unrelated owners, each is viewed as owning
his undivided interest as a separate principal residence to
which the section 121 exclusion applies. It seems inconsistent, therefore, to say that joint owners can be viewed
as each owning a separate residence for purposes of
section 121 but not for section 163(h)(3), when the definition of qualified residence is controlled by section 121.
Consider also the following language from the Joint
Committee on Taxation’s general explanation of the 1986
enactment of the new mortgage deduction rules:
Qualified residence interest may include interest
paid by the taxpayer on debt secured by a residence
of the taxpayer that he owns jointly or as a tenant in

10
Assume a joint note in the amount of $2 million at 7
percent. A pays half of the interest, $70,000, but his interest
deduction is limited to $35,000 under the chief counsel advice.
If, instead, A had purchased a home for himself at half the value
and half the mortgage ($1 million instead of $2 million), A
would be entitled to the full $70,000 deduction (subject to
phaseouts under section 68).
11
See section 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(I).
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common, provided that all the requirements for
qualified residence interest are met.12
Although that language does not directly address the
$1 million limitation, which was added in 1987, it does
make clear that the purchase of a qualified residence was
intended to include the purchase of an undivided interest
in a qualified residence.
Granted, the $1 million limitation is not drafted
clearly. The statutory language provides that the ‘‘aggregate amount treated as acquisition indebtedness for any
period shall not exceed $1,000,000 ($500,000 in the case of
a married individual filing a separate return).’’13 Nowhere does the statute clarify whether the $1 million
limit is per taxpayer, and nowhere does it expressly state
what the limit is for a married individual filing jointly.
That has been a problem since the day the provision was
enacted, and it is a problem that has never been addressed by regulations (in which interpretations of ambiguous statutory language are generally addressed after
sufficient opportunity for public comment). Even so,
once you work through the possible constructions, only
one possibility seems clear.
Consider that in 2001 the IRS addressed for the first
time the issue of whether the limits under section
163(h)(3) that are applied to a married couple filing
separately should also apply to a married couple filing
jointly.14 In FSA 200137033 (June 18, 2001), Doc 200123733, 2001 TNT 180-13, the IRS noted:
The statute is silent on the issue of whether a
married couple filing jointly is treated as one taxpayer, who may only have one principal residence
and one other residence for both spouses, or
whether each spouse may have his or her own
separate principal residence plus his or her own
separate other residence.
The FSA concluded:
Although § 163(h)(4)(A) does not specifically state
that a married couple filing jointly is treated as one
taxpayer for purposes of determining their mortgage interest deductions, we assume that Congress
did not intend to treat married couples filing jointly
differently than married couples filing separately.
Thus, a married couple filing jointly would also be
treated as one taxpayer and would be entitled to
take into account only a principal residence and
one other residence for purposes of calculating
their mortgage interest deduction.

12

See Joint Committee on Taxation, 99th Cong., General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 267 (Comm. Print
1987).
13
Section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
14
There are two types of limits in section 163(h)(3). There is
the dollar limitation ($1 million for acquisition debt and
$100,000 for home equity debt) and the several-homes limitation
(one primary residence and one secondary residence). The
dollar limitation is applied to the aggregate amount of debt
outstanding that is secured by either the primary residence or a
secondary residence. See section 163(h)(4)(A)(i) for the definition
of qualified residence.
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million in acquisition indebtedness for a single home.
The recently released chief counsel advice sets forth a
rule that is detrimental to many of those home buyers. It
concludes that the $1 million acquisition debt limitation
should be applied to the mortgage amount on a single
home rather than to the taxpayer. For example, if A and
B, two unrelated taxpayers, acquire a primary or
secondary residence jointly and the joint mortgage
exceeds $1 million, between them they could not deduct
any mortgage interest on the amount of debt above $1
million. Specifically, the chief counsel advice requires
that each taxpayer deduct only a pro rata share of the
mortgage interest paid by each. The amount of
deductible interest is based on a fraction, the numerator
of which is $1 million and the denominator of which is
the average outstanding balance of the mortgage. Thus,
if A and B jointly purchase a residence for which they
incur a $2 million purchase money mortgage liability,
with the understanding that each will pay $1 million of
the total liability, each taxpayer’s mortgage interest
deduction would be limited to 50 percent of the total
amount of interest paid, rather than 100 percent of the
interest paid on each taxpayer’s $1 million of debt. By
contrast, if A purchased a separate residence and
incurred a $1 million purchase money mortgage, A
would be entitled to deduct 100 percent of the interest
paid on the $1 million debt.10

COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

15

The Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. section 7 (1996),
prevents even married same-sex couples from being treated the
same as spouses.
16
See, e.g., sections 1, 267, 1041, 2040, and 2056.
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million. Some years later, he transfers a 50 percent
interest in the home to his partner, taxpayer B. The
memorandum does not clarify how that transfer occurred. It is possible that B was simply added to the title
and agreed to pay 50 percent of the outstanding mortgage debt. In that case, because A and B are unmarried, A
would have made a taxable gift to B valued at approximately 50 percent of the equity in the home, less the
annual exclusion amount.17 If B instead paid for his 50
percent interest, A would have had a gain to the extent
the home’s value had appreciated since the original
acquisition. Under section 121, the gain would probably
have been excluded from income by A to the extent it did
not exceed $250,000, but that gain would prevent A from
claiming a full $250,000 exclusion on a later sale of his
interest in the property. Of course, if A and B had been
married, there would have been no taxable gift and no
possibility of taxable gain on a transfer of ownership.
That is because spouses have a special rule that covers
interspousal transfers, a rule that is not available to
unmarried partners.18 That differential treatment should
be consistent. If A and B are not treated the same as a
married couple when they transfer an interest in the
home between themselves, why should they be treated
the same as a married couple when they pay their
mortgage interest?
Another reason for reading the $1 million limit as one
that applies per taxpayer rather than per residence or per
mortgage, is that the rule requires calculation of aggregate acquisition indebtedness. Only a taxpayer can aggregate his indebtedness.19

17
And less any fractional share discount that A would be
entitled to claim because the gift is of an undivided interest in
the property.
18
See section 1041.
19
The statute limits acquisition indebtedness to an aggregate
amount of indebtedness not to exceed $1 million. Section
163(h)(3)(B)(ii). If the taxpayer has several acquisition debts, he
is expected to add them together to determine if they exceed the
limitation. Thus it is the taxpayer who is aggregating his total
amount of outstanding debt per tax period. For the purpose of
determining the interest deduction, however, the precise allocation is not among the various types of debt. Rather, it is an
allocation of the interest to the debt that is being paid. Interest
that is allocated to a debt in excess of $1 million is not
deductible. For example, if A pays 50 percent of the interest on
$1.5 million of a $3 million debt, his interest should be allocated
on the basis of a fraction in which $1.5 million is the denominator rather than $3 million. If instead, A pays 100 percent of the
interest on the full $3 million debt, $3 million is the correct
denominator.
Although a single residence can have an aggregate amount
of acquisition indebtedness, the debt may belong to different
owners. Assume, for example, that A purchases a home for $1.5
million with $1 million acquisition debt. He then improves the
home by adding a separate wing for his mother, financing it
with a $500,000 home equity loan. When it is complete, the
mother buys a 30 percent interest in the home, making a down
payment and assuming the $500,000 home equity loan. The
aggregate indebtedness on the property is $2 million. But A’s
aggregate debt is $1.5 million and his mother’s is $500,000. Their
individual aggregate indebtedness is not proportional to their
ownership interests.
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Further, regarding the dollar limitation, the FSA
stated:
The maximum amount of outstanding loans which
a taxpayer, other than a married individual filing
separately, may take into account for purposes of
calculating a mortgage interest deduction is up to
$1,000,000 for acquisition indebtedness and up to
$100,000 for home equity indebtedness on the taxpayer’s qualified residence.
And, as with the number of residences limitation, the
FSA concluded that a married couple, whether filing
separately or jointly, should be limited to interest
deductions on $1 million of acquisition debt and
$100,000 of home equity debt — in the aggregate, not per
residence. In other words, the FSA clearly viewed the
dollar limitations as applying per taxpayer but then also
concluded that a married couple should be treated as
one taxpayer.
The IRS could have concluded that spouses are two
individual taxpayers, with each spouse entitled to a $1
million acquisition debt limit. There is nothing in the
statutory language that commands one construction over
the other. And, as a historical matter, spouses have been
treated as separate taxpayers if they each had income.
Indeed, before 1948, each spouse reported his income
separately. But rather than treat two spouses as two
taxpayers, the IRS felt constrained by the parenthetical
provision in section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) that restricted separately reporting spouses to a single $1 million limit. So
the FSA opted for a rule of construction that would treat
all married couples the same no matter how they elected
to file their tax returns.
One can easily understand that an IRS that believes all
married couples are limited by section 163(h)(3) to interest deductions on only $1 million of aggregate acquisition
indebtedness might be reluctant to conclude that two
partners in a same-sex relationship, or in any type of
unmarried partnership, should be able to claim interest
deductions on $2 million of debt. But if there has been
one principle consistently running through tax law in
recent years, especially since the enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996,15 it is that
unmarried couples cannot be treated the same as married
couples. Differential treatment of married and unmarried
couples may not be wise tax policy, but it is the current
law. It is astounding that, in this environment, chief
counsel would issue an opinion concluding that unrelated taxpayers who buy a home together must be treated
the same as a married couple, even though they are not
treated the same under any other tax code provision that
spells out a special rule for spouses.16
Consider the situation of the taxpayers in the recently
released IRS legal memorandum. Taxpayer A purchases a
home and incurs acquisition indebtedness of $2 million.
He can deduct mortgage interest on only 50 percent of
the debt because his limit on acquisition debt is $1

COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

20

See FSA 200137033.
See http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2009/03/
mcmahon-in-defense-of-cca-200911007.html.
21

most recently refinanced, with the most recent debt
(or portion thereof) treated as the amount of debt
that exceeds the limit.22
The suggested method of allocation is reasonable only
if you aggregate chronologically, taxpayer by taxpayer. If
an original purchaser has exceeded the $1 million limit
by borrowing to acquire his original interest in the
property and then that taxpayer borrows more, the rule
contemplated in the House report would correctly allocate all of the interest on the first $1 million of borrowing
as qualified acquisition indebtedness. But when a subsequent purchaser incurs a subsequent liability secured by
the same property to buy an undivided interest in the
home, that mortgage liability should become acquisition
debt for purposes of the subsequent purchaser’s interest
deductions.
The legal memorandum is contrary to every published
piece of tax scholarship on the tax treatment of unmarried co-owners who pay interest on mortgages that
exceed $1 million.23 There is a growing body of scholarship pointing out that under current tax law, sometimes
married couples win and sometimes they lose. Several
tax scholars, including this author, have questioned
whether those differences in tax rules make sense —
either as good tax policy24 or as constitutional legislation.25 But none of us has ever thought the IRS could
change the rules and treat married and unmarried
couples the same. That would be up to Congress.
Bottom line, the IRS appears reluctant to admit that
there is one tax code provision, section 163(h)(3), in
which unmarried couples are given a benefit compared
with married couples. When the language of the code is
ambiguous, the IRS has the power to clarify. It exercised
that power in the 2001 FSA by concluding that Congress
must have intended to treat all married couples the
same. That construction is inconsistent with the historical treatment of married taxpayers but consistent with
recent changes that treat a husband and wife as one tax
unit.26 The exercise of the IRS’s power is questionable,
however, when the language of the code is sufficiently

22

See H.R. Rep. 100-391(II), P.L. 100-203 (Oct. 26, 1987).
See, e.g., Angela V. Langlotz, ‘‘Tying the Knot: The Tax
Consequences of Marriage,’’ 54 Tax Law. 329 at p. 339 (2001)
(making the point that a married couple’s interest deduction
maximum is half that of two single individuals); Shari Motro,
‘‘A New ‘I Do’: Toward a Marriage Neutral Income Tax,’’ 91 Iowa
L. Rev. 1509 at p. 1551, n. 9 (2006) (same point); and Theodore P.
Seto, ‘‘The Unintended Advantages of Gay Marriage,’’ 65 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 1529 at p. 1571 (2008) (same point). But see supra
note 21 for one tax professor’s defense of the chief counsel
advice.
24
See, e.g., William P. Kratzke, ‘‘The Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) is Bad Income Tax Policy,’’ 35 U. Mem. L. Rev. 399
(2005).
25
See Cain, ‘‘DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code,’’ Chi.Kent L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available on the Social Science
Research Network, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1354564 (arguing that DOMA is unconstitutional as applied to tax law).
26
See, e.g., section 2056 (the unlimited marital deduction,
enacted in 1981), section 1041 (no gains or losses on interspousal
property transfers, enacted in 1984), and section 121(b)(2)(A)(i)
23

(Footnote continued on next page.)
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Yet another reason for reading the $1 million limit as
one that applies per taxpayer is that the statute specifically applies the limit to the aggregate indebtedness ‘‘for
any period.’’ The IRS has construed that language to
mean that a taxpayer can deduct interest to the extent his
‘‘average acquisition indebtedness’’ does not exceed $1
million for the tax year.20 Thus, for example, if a taxpayer
borrowed $2 million exactly halfway through the tax
year, the average outstanding debt for that taxpayer
would be $1 million, and 100 percent of the interest could
be deducted in year 1 as long as it was paid by the
taxpayer. The period referred to is the taxpayer’s tax year,
not the period of the mortgage.
And what if partner B received his interest on December 1 of the third tax year? He is liable for $1 million of
the $2 million debt under his agreement with A, but he is
liable for only one month in his tax period. Surely it
makes more sense to allocate aggregate acquisition indebtedness to B based on the one-month period rather
than the period that the mortgage was in effect during
year 3.
More recently, on the TaxProf blog, Prof. Martin McMahon challenged the construction of section 163(h)(3) as
treating a husband and wife filing a joint return as a
single taxpayer. He has concluded, however, that if
spouses who are co-owners are limited to $1 million in
acquisition indebtedness, the statute must be construed
to restrict unrelated co-owners of a residence to the same
$1 million limit.21 The best way to accomplish that result
is to adopt the construction supported in the legal
memorandum, that is, that the limit applies to aggregate
mortgages per residence rather than to the aggregate
mortgage liability of an individual taxpayer. But it is
difficult to apply that rule in all cases of unrelated
co-owners. For example, the copurchasers may buy their
interests at different times using different types of financing. Why should a person who buys into a share of living
space in a residence owned by someone else and who
incurs less than $1 million in acquisition debt for that
purchase not be allowed to deduct 100 percent of his
mortgage interest? Under the legal memorandum, he
would not be able to if there was already $1 million of
acquisition debt secured by the property.
Although the legislative history addressing the $1
million limitation is sparse, there are some comments in
the House report that suggest Congress was envisioning
a $1 million limit per taxpayer and not per residence or
per mortgage. The House report said Treasury would
need to promulgate regulations to explain how to
allocate interest to qualified debt and to excess debt. It
also said:
In the interim until such regulations are issued, a
reasonable method of allocation should be used. An
example of a reasonable method of allocation is to
ascertain which debt is the debt that exceeds the
limitation by taking debt into account in the
chronological order in which it was incurred or

COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

($500,000 nonrecognition of gain allowed on behalf of two
spouses, if one spouse meets ownership requirements).
27
The legislative history is silent on whether the $1 million
limitation is to be applied at the taxpayer level, at the return
level, or to the aggregate mortgage indebtedness on a single
residence. But the statements in the history about how to
compute the limit suggest that Congress was thinking about
taxpayers or returns and not residences. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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inconsistent with the rest of the tax code.28 The power to
interpret is not the power to rewrite. If there is an
injustice here, it is one that can be fixed only by
Congress.

28
Spouses are treated differently from unrelated individuals
in at least 179 code provisions. See GAO/OCG 97-16, 1997 WL
67783 (F.D.C.H.) at p. 7. When Congress adopted DOMA in
1996, the explicit intent was to ensure that same-sex couples
were not treated the same as spouses under any of those code
sections. The effect of the chief counsel advice is to treat
same-sex spouses, as well as other unmarried couples, the same
as spouses.
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clear (as I believe it is in this case) and the construction
adopted by the IRS not only is counter to that language,
but also unsupported by the legislative history27 and is

